Archive | September, 2012

Refusing to Submit to Breath or Blood Test for OVI is Not Tampering with Evidence

An Ohio Court of Appeals, in a Criminal Appeal fo an OVI conviction, held that refusing to submit to a breath or blood test does not constitute tampering with evidence.

The case is State v. Simin, 2012-Ohio-4389.

The Defendant was observed by the police at 3:00 a.m. stopped at a green light.  The officer observed the car cross over two lanes without signaling to turn right onto the entrance ramp to an Interstate.  The officer followed the car and witnessed several additional traffic violations.

When the office spoke with the defendant, he detected a strong odor of alcohol and observed that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot.  The officer then performed  two field sobriety tests.  The defendant stopped while performing the second test and refused to submit to further testing.  He was arrested and charged with OVI, operating a vehicle under the influence (a/k/a drink driving).

The defendant refused to consent to a breathalyzer test at the police station.  Because he had five prior OVI convictions, the police transported him to a local hospital for a blood draw test.  The blood draw test never took place, however, because the defendant would not cooperate with the test and the hospital refused to perform a forced blood draw.

The court threw out a tampering with evidence charge.  The State’s theory to support the charge is that, by refusing to submit to a breathalyzer or blood alcohol test, the defendant knowingly concealed evidence in an ongoing investigation.

The court reasoned that the defendant “did not actively ‘conceal’ evidence in this case by refusing to submit to a blood draw test.  His refusal was not an overt act.”

The courts; decision was supported by the fact that a separate statute makes it a criminal offense for some drivers to refuse to take a chemical test when facing OVI charges.  The court reqlied on other decisions holding that the tampering statute does  not encompass false statements knowingly made in the course of an investigation as false statements are governed by the crime of falsification.

One of the defendant’s arguments was that the field sobriety test should not have been admissible because the State failed to prove that the officer substantially complied with National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) guidelines when he administered the tests.

The court rejected this argument.  The office testified that he relied upon NHTSA guidelines in performing the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and the one-leg stand test.  Even if the officer’s testimony was lacking in many details of the NHTSA standards, the court reasoned that the defendant did not suffer any prejudice because the officer could testify regarding his observations made during administration of the tests in order to show that the defendant was intoxicated.



Ohio Supreme Court Dismisses JobsOhio Run-Around of the Courts of Appeals

JobsOhio was created by Governor John Kasich to aid economic development.  The non-profit entity has run into legal challenges, including a lawsuit by liberal group, Progress Ohio.  The basic premise of the legal challenges is that the Ohio Constitution prohibits the legislature from establishing a corporation like JobsOhio.

JobsOhio appeared to be on track when a lower court dismissed the Progress Ohio lawsuit due to lack of standing.

JobsOhio is to be funded by state liquor sale proceeds.  However, the Ohio Department of Commerce’ Director, David Goodman, expressed concerns about the constitutionality of JobsOhio.   He refused to sign an agreement transferring the state’s liquor business from Commerce to JobsOhio.

The Kasich administration thought it had a quick and clever path to getting a decision from the Ohio Supreme Court.  JobsOhio filed a mandamus action in the Ohio Supreme Court asking the court to find that legislation creating JobsOhio was constitutional compelling   The mandamus process allowed JobsOhio to skip the Common Pleas Court and the Court of Appeals.

The Ohio Supreme Court didn’t play along.  The decision dismissing the mandamus action is State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4425.  The court was blunt:  “We will not decide constitutional claims raised by parties who seek an advisory declaratory judgment for which they have adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.”

The court noted that the “real object sought is a declaratory judgment.”  This means, JobsOhio sought a ruling from the Court that the legislation was constitutional.  The court said:  “Although JobsOhio’s complaint is couched in terms of compelling ODC Director Goodman to comply with his affirmative duty [to transfer the liquor business], it actually seeks an expedited ruling from this court declaring [the legislation creating JobsOhio] constitutional, so as to preclude any further challenges.”

Translated:  JobsOhio needs to file a declaratory judgement action in the Common Pleas Court.  That decision can be appeals to the courts of appeals and then, perhaps, to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The court also noted that “mandamus is not available if [party seeking the order] has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  JobsOhio has an adequate remedy by way of a declaratory-judgment action in common pleas court to raise its claim that [the legislation creating JobsOhio] are constitutional.”

Justice Cupp dissented, would have allowed a number of interveners (including Progress Ohio) to participate, and would have set the case for briefing and argument.  Justice Pfeiffer dissented and would have considered this an “exceptional circumstances” that demanded “early resolution.”


Suppression Denied When Court Believes Officers Instead of Defendant

An Ohio Court of Appeals, in a criminal appeal, has denied a motion to suppress.  The case came down to who was more believable:  the police or the defendant

The case is State v. Arrazzaq, 2012-Ohio-4365.

The defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine, carrying a concealed weapon, and having a weapon while under a disability. Both drug offenses carried firearm specifications.

The Defendant was parked in the parking lot of a motel known for drug activity when he was spotted by a Deputy Sheriff.  The Deputy saw the defendant “engaging in suspicious activity in the front seat—appearing to slouch to avoid being seen—and he also noticed that the car did not have a properly displayed front license plate.”  The Defendant drove away, and was subsequently stopped for the obscured plate and driving with an expired license.

The Defendant, according to the police, consented to a search of his car.  The Deputy found crack cocaine and a handgun. The Defendant denied that he had given consent for the search.

The initial stop of the vehicle was not challenged.

A consent to search is one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment.  The trial court believed the testimony of the officers that consent had been given, and was not willing to reverse the lower court on a matter related to the “credibility of evidence.”  The court explained:  “We will not reverse a decision because the trial court chose one credible version of events over another.”


Ohio Supreme Court: Prosecutor In One County Can’t Make A Plea Deal for Another County

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a county prosecuting attorney does not have authority to enter into a plea agreement on behalf of the state for crimes committed wholly outside the county in which the prosecuting attorney has been elected.

This is an issue we highlighted just last week.

The case is State v. Billingsley, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4307.

In this case, the defendant was indicted in Summit County in connection with a string of robberies.  As part of a plea agreement, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery with firearm specifications and one count of attempted aggravated robbery.  In addition, he agreed to cooperate with the state in the prosecution of his co-defendants  by providing information about other robberies.  In exchange, the Summit County prosecuting attorney agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.  The prosecutor also agreed that if the defendant disclosed additional robberies that were not contained in the indictment, additional charges would not be brought against the defendant based on those crimes.  The prosecutor also noted on the record that she had been in contact with other counties and “that they will either not pursue charges on their robberies, or if they have already charged that they’ll run [any sentence] concurrent.”

Two months later, the defendant was indicted in Portage County.  The defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds that under the terms of the Summit County plea agreement, he was immune from prosecution.

The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the Portage County prosecuting attorney was not a party to the plea agreement.  Plea agreements, the court noted are essentially contracts.  So in this case, the issue was whether the first prosecutor acted as an agent of the second.  While a prosecuting attorney has authority to enter into plea agreements on behalf of the state, this authority is limited to the county in which the prosecutor was elected.  The court said:  “a county prosecuting attorney does not have actual authority to enter into a plea agreement on behalf of the state with respect to crimes committed wholly outside his or her county.”

The court also rejected a claim that “fundamental fairness” required the court to enforce the plea agreement against the Portage County prosecuting attorney even if the Summit County prosecuting attorney was unauthorized to negotiate on his behalf. The court noted that the defendant had other remedies available, such as seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and moving to suppress the statements that he made in reliance on the agreement.


Discussion of Opinion Upholding Ryan Widmer Conviction

An Ohio Court of Appeals has rejected Ryan Widmer’s initial appeal.

The decision can be found at State v. Widmer, 2012-Ohio-4342.

[Updated 5:42 pm.  Additional links:

The court recited the following significant facts:

August 11, 2008 Widmer called 911 and stated that his 24-year-old wife, Sarah Widmer, had fallen asleep in the bathtub and he thought she was dead.  Widmer drained the bathwater, removed Sarah from the bathtub, and proceeded to attempt CPR.

The initial officer who responded noticed that a pinkish-white, frothy discharge was coming out of Sarah’s mouth and nose.  Emergency personnel who later arrived at the scene also noticed a frothy discharge coming from her vaginal area as they attempted resuscitation, including two unsuccessful attempts at intubation.

Widmer told an officer that he and Sarah were the only people in their home that night.  Later, Widmer consented to have police search his home.  Detective Jeff Braley with the Hamilton Township Police Department noticed that the tub was mostly dry, with the only observable water being droplets located right around the drain.  The officers examined the master bedroom and found blood stains on the carpet in the location where Sarah’s head and vaginal area had been laying.  He also felt the carpet in the and found it to be dry.

The Warren County Coroner, Dr. Uptegrove, determined that Sarah’s death was caused by drowning.  He observed both external and internal injuries to Sarah’s body, including faint bruising on the right-side of her forehead, a petechial hemorrhage on the inner surface of her eyelid, bruising on the left side of her neck, a contusion on the back of her neck, an abrasion on her left armpit, and bruising and lacerations to her upper lip.  His opinion was that Sarah sustained occurred before her death and were not consistent with injuries commonly resulting from CPR.

A second autopsy by a defense expert also found injuries to Sarah.  This doctor, however, was unable to determine whether Sarah’s injuries, including the internal hemorrhaging to her neck, were caused by rigorous CPR or by some other means.  For this reason, Spitz would not have ruled the manner of Sarah’s death a homicide; rather, he would have ruled her death “undetermined.”

Widmer was later charged with aggravated murder.  That same day, a warrant to search the Widmers’ home was executed.  The court described the search:

While executing the warrant, Braley dusted the bathtub for fingerprints and found streak marks that he believed were made by human hands.  The marks were located near the middle of the bathtub, on its far wall (or right-side wall).  Once the marks were discovered, Braley contacted the Miami Valley Crime Lab (Miami Valley) to have the bathtub examined.  Danny Harness, a latent print examiner with Miami Valley, responded to the scene.  Using a superglue fuming process and reflected ultraviolet imaging, Harness observed fingermarks and smear marks on the bathtub.  He was not, however, able to visualize any latent fingerprints of value on the bathtub.  Nonetheless, the decision was made to remove the bathtub from the Widmers’ home, and it was sent to Miami Valley for further processing.  During his second examination of the bathtub Harness used fingerprint powder and found fragmented prints on the bathtub.  However, the prints lacked identifying characteristics and Harness deemed the prints to be of no comparison value.   A few months later, William Hillard, a senior criminalist with the city of Cincinnati, was contacted by the Hamilton Township Police Department to examine the bathtub.  Hillard found marks along the top of the tub and the side of the tub that indicated it had been wiped down, but he was unable to determine when the tub had been wiped down.  Hilliard also found fingertip impressions on the tub.  He was unable to make a positive identification as to who specifically left the fingertip markings, but he was able to determine that the markings were in a downward position and were made by a person of small stature, like a child, a female, or a small male.  Hillard also found a forearm impression on the bathtub and determined from the presence of hair follicles that the impression was made by an adult male.  Hillard determined that this forearm impression overlaid circular marks made on the bathtub by bath product bottles.  Hillard could not, however, determine when the forearm impression or fingertip markings were made on the bathtub.  

Widmer was initially convicted of murder, a lesser-included offense, and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.  A new trial was granted after it was discovered that jury members, during their deliberation, had improperly discussed personal and external matters regarding the length of time it took them to dry after bathing.

A second trial took place in May 2010.  After the jury was unable to reach a verdict, a mistrial was declared.

At a third trial, he was again convicted of murder.

Widmer raised a number of issues on appeal.  The most important were the seizure of the bathtub and the sufficiency of the evidence.

Widmer suggested that counsel should have filed a motion to suppress the seizure of the bathtub on the grounds that the seizure was outside the scope of the search warrant.  The court noted that the search warrant authorized police to search the Widmers’ residence for “any evidence of criminal activity.” The court said, “Although the warrant did not specifically list the bathtub, this does not invalidate its seizure.  The warrant still enabled the officers to reasonably ascertain and identify the things that were authorized to be seized . . Common sense dictates that in an alleged bathtub drowning, valuable evidence, including latent fingerprints, can be obtained from a search of the bathroom and bathtub.”

In addition, the court said that the bathtub could be seized as an “instrumentality of the crime.”  Finally, the court said:

In the present case there is no evidence demonstrating that the police deliberately set out to seize the bathtub without setting it forth in the search warrant.  Furthermore, there is no evidence demonstrating that the police acted with deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Widmer’s Fourth Amendment rights when seizing the bathtub.  Rather, the evidence produced at trial demonstrated that officers seized the bathtub in good faith reliance on the search warrant, removing the bathtub only after a search for latent fingerprints revealed the fingermarks and smear marks. 

In regards to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court said:

The state presented evidence that Sarah and Widmer were the only two individuals present in the Widmers’ home on the night of Sarah’s death.  The state also presented evidence that Sarah died from a forcible drowning.  Dr. Uptegrove testified that during Sarah’s autopsy he observed contusions on Sarah’s scalp and on the back of her neck, external bruising to her forehead and the left side of her neck, and significant internal bruising to the anterior of her neck.  Uptegrove testified that Sarah’s injuries were not consistent with or caused by medical intervention or the administration of CPR.  Rather, Uptegrove believed the bruises to Sarah’s neck were caused prior to her death and resulted from significant compressional force or a blunt force being applied to her neck.  Dr. Lee, an expert in pathology, also testified that the injuries Sarah sustained to her neck, scalp, and forehead were atypical to a natural drowning event and were not attributable to medical intervention.  Lee testified that the bruising around Sarah’s neck was caused by blunt force injury or compressive force.  From this testimony, the jury could have drawn a reasonable inference that the bruising around Sarah’s neck occurred when Widmer used compressive force to hold Sarah’s head underwater, thereby causing her death.  

The court said that the jury was free to reject Widmer’s alternative theory as to the manner of Sarah’s death:  a seizure or heart condition.  The court said, “Not only did the state present expert testimony that Sarah’s bruising was caused by compressive force, but the state also presented testimony that Sarah was a healthy 24-year-old woman who had never had a seizure or been diagnosed with epilepsy.  The state further presented expert testimony that Sarah’s childhood heart murmur was an “innocent heart murmur” that typically disappears on its own within a few months or a year of life.  Experts testifying for the state also testified that there was no evidence of a cardiovascular or neurological disease or defect which caused or contributed to Sarah’s death.”

Finally, the court rejected an argument that they should have been permitted to obtain additional information about the investigating officer’s education and employment background.  The court agreed that this evidence was unlikely to be admissible character evidence, and that it could “mislead the jury or cause confusion of the issues.”  This issue, the court felt, would be “collateral to Widmer’s murder trial, and exploration of this issue was likely to ‘bog down’ the criminal trial.” and lead to confusion of the jury and misleading of the jury.  The court also said that “Widmer had the opportunity to challenge the integrity of the police officers’ investigation of Sarah’s death by cross-examining Braley and other testifying officers about the processing and collecting of evidence from the crime scene as well as their role, if any, in the decision to charge Widmer with the crime.”


“Bolting” From the Courtroom To Avoid Going Into Custody Is Not Escape

An Ohio Court of Appeals has held that a defendant who “bolts” from the courtroom when the judge says he is to be taken into custody cannot be convicted of escape.

The case is State v. Tensley, 2012-Ohio-4265.

The Defendant was convicted of tampering with evidence and escape.  The defendant had allegedly sold marijuana to a confidential informant.  The police executed a search warrant at his home.  The Defendant threw a bag of marijuana out of a bedroom window when the officers had arrived to execute the warrant.  As he awaited trial, he remained out on bond and was required to wear an electronic-monitoring device.  His bond was revoked when he violated curfew and tested positive for marijuana.

At a court hearing, the judge told the Defendant that his bond had been revoked and instructed him to sit in a chair in the jury box.  He was told that, “[T]he sheriff will come and take you away.”  The Defendant did not wait until a sheriff’s deputy arrived, and instead bolted out of the courtroom and out of the courthouse.

He was indicted for escape in the case numbered for fleeing from the courthouse, and he was eventually arrested.

The Escape statute states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person, knowing the person is under detention * * * or being reckless in that regard, shall purposely break or attempt to break the detention * * *.”  The statute defines detention to include an “arrest.”

The defendant argued that he was not “under detention” for purposes of the escape statute because he was not under arrest at the time that he fled from the courthouse.  The appeals court agreed.  The court said:

The judge . . . had instructed [the Defendant] to sit down in the jury box and informed him that the sheriff would  come  to  get  him.    [The Defendant] had  fled  before  an  officer  had  even  entered  the room.  We determine that this evidence was insufficient to establish that [the Defendant] had been under detention at the time he had fled because the judge had not had the requisite intent to arrest [the Defendant]. . . As the judge specifically stated, “the sheriff will come,” which is a statement in futuro, i.e., that [the Defendant]  was “to be” arrested. 

The Appeals Court reversed the escape conviction.  However, the tampering with evidence conviction – for throwing the marijuana out the window, remained (although in a separate part of the opinion the appeals court ordered that the defendant receive a new sentencing hearing).



Calendars of Public Employees are Public Records, says Ohio Supreme Courtio Supreme

A recent decision by the Ohio Supreme Court addresses, in part, whether calendars of public employees are public records.  This may be significant because Ohio Democrats have sued Republican Governor John Kasich seeking access to his schedule.

The case is State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-4246 (September 20, 2012).

In this case, an attorney representing defendants in criminal cases, sought certain records from the Mahoning County Prosecutor’s Office.  The underlying case involves a 73-count indictment charging Anthony M. Cafaro Sr., the Cafaro Company, Ohio Valley Mall Company, the Marion Plaza, Inc., John McNally IV, John Reardon, Michael V. Sciortino, John Zachariah, Martin Yavorcik, and Flora Cafaro with engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, conspiracy, perjury, bribery, money laundering, conflict of interest, filing false financial disclosure statements, and soliciting or accepting improper communications.

The case is complicated and involves a lot of detailed issues, but what may be those most important aspect of the case involves calendars.

As part of the records request, the attorney requested calendars of various employees.

The Supreme Court noted that in a previous case, the Tenth District Court of Appeals had upheld a denial of access to the governor’s personal calendars and appointment books.  The court had reasoned that the calendars were not public records because there was no evidence that the calendars and books documented any official purpose.

In contrast to the calendars of the former governor at issue in that case, in this case the Supreme Court held that the calendars “were used at least occasionally by [the employees] to make work-related entries, like hearing dates and deadlines for briefs.  Work-related calendar entries are manifestly items created by [the] . . . employees that serve to document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the office.  These portions of the requested calendars consequently” are public records.  Accordingly, the attorney was entitled to the requested copies of those portions of the calendars of that are work-related entries.



OVI Conviction Vacated Because State Failed to Present Sufficient Evidence that Blood Draw Complied with Regulations

An OVI conviction has been reversed because the State failed to prove that the defendant’s blood was drawn and tested in accordance with the appropriate regulations.

The case is State v. Ragle, 2012-Ohio-4253.

The Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol  (“OVI”) after he was involved in a one-car accident.

The Defendant argued that the State failed to prove that his blood was drawn and tested in accordance with the appropriate regulations.  In OVI cases, a defendant must first challenge the validity of the alcohol test by way of a pretrial motion to suppress.  The state then has the burden to show that the test was administered in substantial compliance with the regulations prescribed by the Director of Health.  Once the state has satisfied this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate prejudice by anything less than strict compliance.

In this case, the defendant argued that the there was no evidence that his blood was drawn “with a sterile dry needle” and placed “into a vacuum container with a solid anticoagulant,”    as required by the regulations.  The nurse who had drawn the blood testified that she had no idea if the vials had anticoagulants.  An officer testified that he provided a standard blood and urine test kit to the nurse and that he believed that the vials in the kits contained anticoagulants.

The State did not provide any testimony regarding whether the needle was dry and sterile as required by the regulations.

The court felt that the motion to suppress provided sufficient notice to the state of the specific evidence it was obligated to present at the suppression hearing.  The state could have, but did not, present any evidence from the individuals responsible for assembling the test kits and/or testing the defendant’s blood in order to demonstrate compliance with State regulations.

The court reversed the portion of the conviction that relied upon the blood evidence on the grounds that “we cannot say that the State met its burden to prove that it substantially complied with” the regulations.



Life Imprisonment with Possible Parole for Juvenile is Not Cruel and Unusual Punishment

An Ohio Appeals Court, in reviewing a criminal appeal from a conviction, has determined that a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole for an offense committed when the defendant was a juvenile does constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The case is State v. Bokeno, 2012-Ohio-4218.

The Defendant was convicted on multiple sexual offenses against four minor victims.  At the time of the commission of these acts, the defendant was under the age of 18.  However, he was not indicted until he was over the age of 21.  Because one of the victims was under the age of ten at the time of the rape, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 20 years.

The defendant argued that his life sentence with the possibility of parole after 20 years is a violation of his due process rights and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.  He also argued that that he should not be arbitrarily tried and punished as an adult for crimes he committed while under the age of 18.

The court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court has previously addressed some of these issues in State v. Warren, 118 Ohio St.3d 200, 2008-Ohio-2011:

In Warren, the Court determined that a defendant’s due process rights were not violated by the imposition of a mandatory term of life imprisonment for rape of a victim under the age of 13 when the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense but was not prosecuted until he had passed the age of 21. 

However, since that decision the United States Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010).  In Graham, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the state from sentencing a juvenile to a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense.  The Graham Court said that if it a state imposes a sentence of life for a non-homicide conviction, the state “must provide [the offender] with some realistic opportunity to obtain release.”  Applying Graham to this case, the court found that the Constitution was not violated because the defendant has the possibility of parole after 20 years.


Plea Agreement in Neighboring County Is Not Binding on a County Prosecutor

A plea deal in one county is not binding in another county, according to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals.

The case is State v. Jackson, 2012-Ohio-4219.

In 2007, police investigated the theft of a large plasma television, an ATM, and a safe from a tavern in Butler County.  About a month later, the business owner found two men inside the business who had entered through a smashed glass door.  A video surveillance camera captured the men attempting to pry an ATM from the floor.

In 2009 the defendant was indicted for burglary, breaking and entering, grand theft, two counts of safecracking, and one count of attempted safecracking.

The defendant argued that the charges in Butler County should be dismissed because the defendant had entered into a plea agreement with the prosecutor in neighboring Hamilton County.  In order to resolve charges in Hamilton County, the defendant agreed to provide information regarding other break-ins.  The state agreed to a one-year prison sentence and would not charge him for any of the offenses that he admitted to.

The defendant became a suspect in the Butler County break-in when a detective in Butler County uploaded surveillance video onto a website in which other police officers throughout southwest Ohio could view the video and identify possible suspects.  The Defendant was identified by a detective in another agency.

The court rejected the defendant’s argument.  The court noted that “several other Ohio districts have resolved this issue and found that a county’s plea agreement does not prevent criminal charges in other counties when the criminal acts do not constitute allied offenses of similar import.”  The key to this issue is whether the prosecutor who made the plea deal “had actual, apparent, or contractual authority to bind the prosecutor in another county.”

The general rule is that a county prosecutor’s agency authority extends to the county line when investigating and prosecuting crimes.  In Ohio, county prosecutors are not considered to be agents of each other, able to plea bargain offenses that are committed outside their counties.  Thus, as with other contracts, if a county prosecutor is not a party to a plea agreement, the county prosecutor is not bound by the terms of that agreement.

In this case, because the Butler County Prosecutor was not part of the plea agreement, he could not be bound by the deal in Hamilton County.

The defendant was subsequently convicted of the offenses and sentenced to ten years in prison.